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Universally Weakly Secure Coset Coding Schemes for Minimum
Storage Regenerating (MSR) Codes
Swanand Kadhe and Alex Sprintson
Abstract—We consider the problem of designing codes for
distributed storage that protect user data against eavesdroppers
that can gain access to network links as well as individual
nodes. Our goal is to achieve weak security (also known as block
security) that requires that the eavesdroppers would not be able
to decode individual files or combinations of a small number of
files. The standard approach for achieving block security is to
use a joint design scheme that consists of (inner) storage code
and the (outer) coset code. However, jointly designing the codes
requires that the user, who pre-processes and stores the files,
should know the underlying storage code in order to design
the (outer) linear transformation for achieving weak security.
In many practical scenarios, such as storing the files on the
third party cloud storage system, it may not be possible for the
user to know the underlying storage code.
In this work, we present universal schemes that separate the
outer code design from the storage code design for minimum
storage regenerating codes (MSR). Our schemes allow the
independent design of the storage code and the outer code.
Our schemes use small field size and can be used in a broad
range of practical settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coding for distributed storage systems (DSS) has recently
received significant attention from the research community.
The main focus has been on designing and analyzing novel
erasure codes that efficiently handle node failures in dis-
tributed storage systems, see, e.g., [1]–[4].
An important challenge for a DSS is providing secrecy
against eavesdropping. The problem with using conventional
secret key-based encryption techniques is that they require
secret key management mechanisms, which incur significant
computational and communication overheads in distributed
settings. Following the work of [5], [6], a number of inves-
tigations have been carried out on information-theoretically
securing the regenerating codes, see, e.g., [7]–[13].
Most of the security results in distributed storage commu-
nity are focused on the paradigm of information-theoretic
perfect secrecy. Intuitively, perfect secrecy requires that
the eavesdropper gains absolutely no information about the
stored data from its observations. To be precise, suppose that
a DSS is storing Bs data files S = {S1, . . . , SBs}, where
each file can be considered as a symbol in a finite field Fq.
Let E denote the set of (encoded) files that an eavesdropper
Eve can observe. A DSS is said to be perfectly secure if the
mutual information between the message symbols S and the
eavesdropped symbols E is zero, i.e., I (S;E) = 0.
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For many practical storage systems, perfect secrecy con-
dition might be too strong. Moreover, coding schemes that
provide perfect secrecy involve mixing data symbols with
random keys to confuse the eavesdropper, which incurs loss
in the storage capacity. Considering these drawbacks of the
perfect secrecy notion, we focus on the notion of weak
security proposed by Bhattad and Narayanan [14].
The weak security condition requires that Eve cannot
gain any information about any group of files of size g,
where g is some positive integer. Based on the premise
that individual files carry meaningful information, the
motivation behind weak security is that, even if Eve
obtains any g − 1 files as a side information, she cannot
decode for any new file. For example, let the number
of files be Bs = 4, and suppose the files are chosen
independently and uniformly at random over F5. Suppose
that Eve observes the following two encoded symbols
E = {S1 + S2 + S3 + S4, S1 + 2S2 + 3S3 + 4S4}. The
scheme protects any group of g = 2 files. This ensures
that, even if Eve has a side-information of any one file,
she cannot decode for any other file by observing E. Note
that, when g = 1, weak security requires that Eve gains no
information about any individual file, i.e., I (Si;E) = 0 ∀i.
It was observed in [14] that weakly secure coding schemes
do not incur loss in the capacity, as it is not required to mix
any private randomness. Essentially, a weakly secure scheme
protects a group of files by using the other files as random
keys.
Note that the notion of weak security that is introduced
in [14] and considered throughout this paper, is different
from the conventional notion of information-theoretic weak
secrecy, which is defined for asymptotically large block-
lengths. The weak security notion considered in this paper
is applicable to finite block-lengths as well. The notion of
weak security has also been referred to as block security, as
it requires protecting blocks of information of different sizes
(see, e.g. [15]).
Despite of its practical benefits, there have been relatively
very few attempts on employing weak security for DSS.
In [16], Oliveira et al. have presented a construction of
weakly secure erasure codes for DSS without considering the
regeneration aspects. Dau et al. [15] analyzed the weak secu-
rity properties of two families of regenerating codes: regular-
graph codes [17] and product-matrix codes [18]. Going a step
ahead, in [19], [20], we presented outer code constructions
that weakly secure product-matrix (PM) codes [18].
In all these solutions, the standard approach for achieving
weak security is to jointly design an outer coset code and an
inner storage code. The main limitation of jointly designing
the codes is that it requires the user, who designs the (outer)
linear transformation for achieving weak security, to know
the underlying storage code. In many practical scenarios,
such as storing the files on the third party cloud storage
system, it may not be possible for the user to know the
underlying storage code.
In this paper, we focus on universal schemes that sep-
arate the outer code design from the storage code design.
Such a universal approach was first proposed in [21] (see
also [22]) to achieve perfect security in network coding.
This approach was extended for weakly securing network
codes in [23], [24], and was adapted for weakly securing
distributed storage codes, namely regenerating codes, in [25].
The idea in these works is to design an outer code based
on rank-metric codes [26]. However, the main drawback of
using a rank-metric code is that the required field size is
significantly large. In particular, the universal outer code
of [25] requires the field size of q2B , where q is the field size
of the underlying storage code and B is the total number of
information symbols stored.
The question we ask in this paper is that if, instead of
designing a universal outer code for weakly securing any
storage code, if we restrict to securing a particular class of
storage codes, can we design outer codes over small field
size. We answer this question affirmatively by considering
an important class of storage codes called minimum storage
regenerating (MSR) codes [1]. Essentially, an MSR code is a
maximum distance separable (MDS) code that minimizes the
amount of data downloaded while repairing a failed node.
Our Contributions: First, we present a construction of
universal outer code that can achieve weak security of
individual symbols, i.e., g = 1, in any (n, k) MSR code
against an eavesdropper that can observe any k − 1 storage
nodes. The required field size of the scheme is O(Bk),
where B is the number of stored information symbols. Next,
we present a construction of universal outer code that can
achieve weak security with maximum possible g in any MSR
code against an eavesdropper that can observe any single
storage node. The required field size of the scheme is O(Bα),
where B is the total number of stored information symbols
and α is the number of symbols stored on each node.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Regenerating Codes
Consider a DSS that stores a set of B files given as
S = {S1, . . . , SB}, where each file can be considered
as a uniformly and independently drawn symbol from a
finite field Fq. The system contains n storage nodes, with
each node capable of storing α files. An (n, k, d, α, β)
regenerating code encodes the B files into nα files over Fq
in such a way that it satisfies the following two properties: (i)
reconstruction property – a data collector (DC) connecting
to any k out of n nodes can reconstruct the entire set of files;
(ii) regeneration property – when a storage node fails, it can
be regenerated by adding a new node which downloads β
symbols each from any d out of the remaining n− 1 nodes.
The d nodes participating in node repair are referred to as the
helper nodes, and the dβ number of symbols downloaded is
referred to as the repair bandwidth.
Using the cut-set bounds, the capacity of an optimal
(n, k, d, α, β) regenerating code is bounded as [1]
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d− i)β}. (1)
It is easy to see that there is trade-off between storage space
per node α and repair bandwidth dβ. Most of the results
in the literature focus on the two extreme points of the
optimal storage-repair bandwidth trade-off curve. The codes
on one extreme point that minimize the repair bandwidth first
and then the storage per node are referred to as Minimum
Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) codes; whereas, the codes
on the other extreme point that first minimize the storage
per node and then the repair bandwidth are referred to
as Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) codes. Several
explicit code constructions have been proposed for these
extreme points for exact repair model, wherein the repaired
node is an exact replica of the failed node (see, e.g., [2],
[18], [27], [28] and references therein). In this paper, we
focus on the codes at the MSR point. Note that, for MSR
codes, B = kα, and these codes can be considered as MDS
codes with minimum repair bandwidth.
B. Eavesdropper Model
We assume that an eavesdropper Eve can access the data
stored in any ℓ (< k) storage nodes. Further, we assume that
Eve is passive, has unbounded computational power, and has
the knowledge of the coding scheme being used.
It is worth pointing out that, for an MSR code, the number
of downloaded symbols (dβ) is strictly greater than the num-
ber of stored symbols (α). Therefore, Eve can potentially
gain more information by observing the data downloaded
during node repair than merely observing the data stored on
the node. This motivates a generalized eavesdropper model
for a DSS, called as the (l1, l2)-eavesdropper model, where,
Eve can access the data stored on any l1 nodes, and the data
downloaded during the regeneration of any l2 nodes (see [7],
[9]). Our focus is on the case l1 = ℓ, l2 = 0.
C. Information-theoretic Secrecy
Suppose we need to store a set S of Bs files securely,
where Bs ≤ B. Let E denote the set of (coded) files
observed by Eve. A DSS is said to be perfectly secure
if I (S;E) = 0. Under this requirement, Pawar et al. [5]
characterized an upper bound on the secrecy capacity as:
Bs ≤
k−1∑
i=ℓ
min{α, (d− i)β}. (2)
Comparing (1) and (2), we can say that in a perfectly secure
DSS, the ℓ nodes that are accessed by the eavesdropper can-
not effectively contain any useful information. Consequently,
the perfect secrecy requirement results in a loss of storage
capacity, i.e., Bs < B.
In this paper, we focus on a relaxed, yet practically
appealing notion of weak security [14]. The weak security
condition demands that all small groups of files of bounded
size are protected from the eavesdropper. The bound on
group size is given by a parameter g. We define the weak
security in the following.
Definition 1: Let S = [S1 S2 · · · SBs ] be the set of
Bs files, each one chosen independently and uniformly at
random over some finite field Fq . Let SG := {Si : i ∈ G}
for some set G ⊂ [Bs], where [Bs] := {1, . . . , Bs}.
Consider a DSS encoding S into nα codes files as C = f(S),
where f : FBsq → Fnαq is some (potentially stochastic) en-
coder. The coded files C are stored across n nodes as
C = [C1 C2 · · · Cn], where Ci is the set of α files stored
on node i. Suppose Eve observes a set L ⊂ [n] of ℓ storage
nodes and let CL = ∪i∈LCi. Then, the encoder f is said to
be g-weakly secure against an eavesdropper of strength ℓ, if,
for every L ⊂ [n] such that |L| ≤ ℓ, we have,
I (SG ;E) = 0 ∀G ⊆ [Bs] : |G| ≤ g. (3)
Note that when g = 1, we have I (Si;CL) = 0, ∀i ∈ [Bs].
Assuming that individual files carry meaningful information,
1-weak security prevents eavesdropper from gaining any
meaningful information.
It is easy to verify that condition (3) is equivalent to the
following condition [23, Proposition 5]:
I (Si;CL|SG) = 0 ∀i ∈ [Bs] \ G, ∀G ⊂ [Bs] : |G| ≤ g − 1.
(4)
In other words, when the system is g-weakly secure, even if
Eve obtains any g− 1 files as a side information, she cannot
decode any additional file. We note that, in [14], the weak
security notion was proposed using condition (4).
Remark 1: As noted in [23], g-weak security is equivalent
to perfect security of a message S′ = SG ⊂ S for any G
of size up to g (see (3)). In particular, if we treat SG as a
message and the rest of the symbols as random keys (for
any G of size up to g), then (3) is equivalent to the perfect
secrecy of SG . Therefore, it is possible to store B symbols
with g-weak security against an eavesdropper observing any
µ coded symbols, only if g ≤ B − µ.
III. OUTER COSET CODE FOR WEAK SECURITY
Our approach to achieve weak security is to use an outer
code construction based on coset coding [29]. We briefly
review the coset coding in this section. A coset code is
constructed using a (B,B−Bs) linear code Cs over Fq with
parity-check matrix H ∈ FBs×Bq . Specifically, the set of Bs
files S is encoded by selecting uniformly at random some
X ∈ FBq such that S = HX . In other words, the vector S
can be considered as a syndrome specifying a coset of Cs,
and the codeword X is a randomly chosen element of that
coset.
Next, the codeword X is encoded using a regenerating
code (as an inner code) to obtain C ∈ Fnαq , i.e., C = GX ,
where G ∈ Fnα×Bq is a generator matrix of the regenerating
code. To obtain the information symbols S, a user needs
to first decode the regenerating code to get X , and then,
decode the outer coset code to get S. The decoding operation
of a coset code consists of simply computing the syndrome
S = HX . The node repair process is inherited from the
regenerating code.
For the rest of the paper, for simplicity, we refer to H as
a coset code and G as a storage/MSR code.
To design the matrix H appropriately, we need to trans-
form the weak security condition (3) into a condition in-
volving H . For this, we use the following result from [22,
Lemma 6], which is a generalization of [30, Theorem 1].
Lemma 1: ( [22]) Suppose that a coset code with parity-
check matrix H ∈ FBs×Bq is used as an outer code over a
storage code with generator matrix G to store the message
S = [S1 · · · SBs ]. Suppose each symbol Si for i ∈ [Bs] is
chosen independently and uniformly at random over some
finite alphabet. Let CL = G
′X be the µ symbols observed
by an eavesdropper, where G′ is a µ× B sub-matrix of G.
Then, for any G ⊆ [Bs] such that |G| ≤ B − µ, we have
I (SG ;CL) = rankHG + rankG
′ − rank
[
HG
G′
]
, (5)
where HG is a sub-matrix of H formed by choosing the rows
indexed by the set G.
Then, using (3) and (5), it follows that a universal coset
code H ensures that
rank
[
HG
G′
]
= rankHG + rankG
′, (6)
for every G ⊂ [Bs] such that |G| ≤ g and for every
storage code G. (Recall that G′ is a µ × B sub-matrix of
G corresponding to µ eavesdropped symbols.)
Such a coset codeH was first constructed in [23] for g ≤ 2
using a rank-metric code over FqB to secure any G over Fq
with application to network coding. This construction was
extended for g ≤ Bs − µ in [24] again using rank-metric
codes, requiring the field size of q2B , where q is the field
size for the entries of G. The authors of [25] adapted the
construction of [24] to weakly secure any regenerating code.
The main drawback of such an outer code based on a rank-
metric code is its high field size. Instead of securing any
regenerating code, we restrict our attention to the class of
MSR codes, and present universal outer code constructions
over small field size in the next section.
IV. UNIVERSAL OUTER CODES FOR MSR CODES
In the following, we present constructions for universal
outer codes to achieve g-weak security in any (n, k, d, α, β)-
MSR code. In particular, we consider the following two
scenarios: (i) maximum ℓ and minium g, i.e., ℓ = k − 1
and g = 1, and (ii) minimum ℓ and maximum g, i.e., ℓ = 1
and g = B − α. We assume that the user only knows the
code parameters n, k, d, α, β, and q. In addition, we assume
that the encoding of the MSR code is systematic. We begin
with setting up necessary notation for MSR codes.
Notation for MSR Codes: Consider an (n, k, d, α, β)-MSR
code C over Fq , storing B = kα information symbols (see
Sec. II-A). Let G =
[
GT1 G
T
2 · · · GTn
]T
be an nα × B
generator matrix of C, where Gi is an α × B matrix
corresponding to the symbols stored on node i. We refer
to Gi as a generator matrix of node i. Let us denote Gi as
Gi = [Gi,1 Gi,2 · · · Gi,α], where Gi,j is an α×α matrix.
We assume that G is in systematic form, and the first k
nodes are systematic. In other words, we have Gi,i = Iα and
Gi,j = 0α for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k such that i 6= j, where Iα is an
α× α identity matrix and 0α is an α× α zero matrix.
For any matrix (or vector) W with B = kα columns, we
refer to the α columns of W indexed from (j − 1)α + 1
through jα, as the j-th thick-column of W (1 ≤ j ≤ k).
A. Construction for ℓ = k − 1 and g = 1
Note that ℓ = k−1 is the maximum possible strength that
Eve can have for an (n, k)-MSR code, as any k nodes recover
the entire stored data. The motivation behind g = 1 is to
protect every individual file, which usually carry meaningful
information. The idea for constructing H is to begin with
a Vandermonde matrix over some base field and then scale
some of its appropriately chosen columns by elements lying
in an extension field. The details are given in the following.
Construction 1: Consider the parameters of an MSR code
as n, k, d, α, β and q. Choose qr as the smallest power of q
greater than equal to B = kα. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ B, choose the
entries hi,j of H as follows:
hi,j =
{
ω
j
α βi−1j if α | j,
βi−1j otherwise,
(7)
where β1, · · · , βB are B distinct elements of Fqr , and ω is
a primitive element of F
q
k+1
r
.
Next, we show that the above construction can universally
achieve 1-weak security for any MSR code for ℓ = k − 1.
Theorem 1: The outer coset code of Construction 1 can
be used universally with any (n, k)-MSR code to store
Bs = kα symbols over Fqk+1r with 1-weak security against
an eavesdropper observing any ℓ = k−1 nodes, each storing
α coded symbols.
Proof: First, note that, sinceH is a B×B Vandermonde
matrix with some of its columns scaled, it is non-singular,
resulting in Bs = B = kα.
Next, we prove the 1-weak security. Let Hi denote the
i-th row of H . Let the set of nodes accessed by Eve be
L = {i1, · · · , iℓ} and let CL = {Ci : i ∈ L}. For g = 1,
we want to prove I (Si;CL) = 0 for every i ∈ [B] (see (3)).
From (5), this is equivalent to showing that, for every i ∈ [B],
the following matrix is full-rank:
T =
[
Hi
G′
]
=


Hi
Gi1
Gi2
...
Giℓ

 (8)
Towards proving this, we consider the following two cases.
Case 1: L ⊂ [k]. In other words, all the nodes Eve
observes are systematic. Let j = [k] \ L. Then, the j-th
thick-column of G′ is zero. Clearly, Hi cannot be in the row
space of G′.
Case 2: L 6⊂ [k]. In this case, at least one parity node is
eavesdropped. Arbitrarily choose an index j such that j ∈
[k]\L. Note that there are at least two such systematic nodes
not in L. Due to the reconstruction property of MSR codes,[
G′
Gj
]
should be invertible. As the j-th thick-column of Gj
is an identity matrix and all its other thick-columns are zero,
this implies that the (k − 1)α × (k − 1)α matrix, say G′′,
formed by all the thick-columns of G′ except the j-th one
is invertible. Thus, we can perform row operations on T to
obtain the following matrix:
T1 =
[
Hi
(G′′)−1G′
]
.
It is easy to see that, after reordering the rows and columns
of T1, we can get
T2 =


Hi,1 Hi,2 · · · Hi,k−1 Hi,k
Iα 0α · · · 0α P1,α
0α Iα · · · 0α P2,α
...
...
. . .
...
...
0α 0α · · · Iα Pk−1,α

 , (9)
whereHi,j = [β
i−1
(j−1)α+1 β
i−1
(j−1)α+2 · · · βi−1jα−1 ωjβi−1jα ], and
Pi,j ∈ Fα×αqr . Now, we obtain a square matrix
T3 by appending T2 with the (α − 1) × B matrix
T ′2 =
[
0(α−1)×(k−1)α Iα−1 0(α−1)×1
]
, where 0t×m is a t×
m all-zero matrix and Iα−1 is an (α− 1)× (α− 1) identity
matrix.
Using the identity matrix Iα−1 in T
′
2, we eliminate all but
the last entry in the k-th thick-column of T2 to obtain the
following matrix:
T4 =


Hi,1 · · · Hi,k−1 0α×(α−1) ωjβi−1jα
Iα · · · 0α 0α×(α−1) p1,α
...
. . .
...
...
...
0α · · · Iα 0α×(α−1) pk−1,α
0(α−1)×α · · · 0(α−1)×α Iα−1 0(α−1)×1

 ,
(10)
for some pi,α ∈ Fα×1qr , 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
Now, the determinant of T4 can be written as a polynomial
in ω as follows:
det(T4) = ω
jβi−1jα + · · · . (12)
Note that det(T4) is a non-zero polynomial in ω with
coefficients in Fqr , i.e., det(T4) ∈ Fqr [ω]. Further, the degree
of this polynomial is at most k. Since ω is a primitive element
of F
q
k+1
r
, the degree of its minimal polynomial is k+1. Thus,
ω cannot be a root of any polynomial in Fqr of degree at
most k. Hence, we have det(T4) 6= 0. Therefore, T4 is non-
singular, and it follows that T must be full-rank.
Field Size Comparison: It was shown in [23] a parity-
check matrix H of a rank-metric code, in particular a
Gabidulin code [26], can be used to achieve g-weak security
for g ≤ 2. The field size requirement of such a code is
T ′ =
[
HG
G−1j,1Gj
]
(W ′)−1 =


hj1,1 hj1,2 · · · hj1,α hj1,α+1 hj1,α+2 · · · hj1,B
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
hjg ,1 hjg ,2 · · · hjg ,α hjg ,α+1 hjg ,α+2 · · · hjg ,B
ω 0 · · · 0 p1,1 p1,2 · · · p1,B−α
0 ω · · · 0 p2,1 p2,2 · · · p2,B−α
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · ω pα,1 pα,2 · · · pα,B−α


(11)
qB , where q is the field of the underlying storage code and
B = kα is the total number of information symbols. Since
q ≥ n for any known MSR code (see e.g., [27], [28], and
references therein), the required field size is O(nkα).
The proposed construction operates over the field size of
qk+1r , where qr is the smallest power of q greater than or
equal to B. Assuming that q = O(n) and B = kα > q,
the proposed construction requires the field size of at most
O
(
(nkα)k+1
)
. Note that for high-rate MSR codes, the best
known codes have α to be exponential in k, and it is
shown that α needs to be at least exponential in
√
k [31].
Thus, a rank-metric code based outer code would require
significantly larger field size as compared to the proposed
scheme.
B. Construction for ℓ = 1 and g = B − α
Note that B − α is the maximum value of g, as Eve
observes α symbols when ℓ = 1 (see Remark 1). The idea of
constructing H is similar to Construction 1. In this case, we
begin with a Cauchy matrix over some base field and scale
its first α columns by a primitive element of an extension
field. The details are as follows.
Construction 2: Consider the parameters of an MSR code
as n, k, d, α, β and q. Choose qr as the smallest power of q
greater than or equal to 2B, where B = kα. Construct H as
the product of two matrices as
H = H ′W ′, (13)
where H ′ is a B×B Cauchy matrix with each entry chosen
from Fqr , and W
′ is a B × B identity matrix with its first
α columns scaled by 1/ω. Here, ω is a primitive element of
the extension field Fqα+1r . We can view H as follows.
H =


h1,1
ω
· · · h1,α
ω
h1,α+1 · · · h1,B
h2,1
ω
· · · h2,α
ω
h2,α+1 · · · h2,B
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
hB,1
ω
· · · hB,α
ω
hB,α+1 · · · hB,B

 , (14)
where [hi,j ], 1 ≤ i, j ≤ B, is a Cauchy matrix.
Next, we show that the above construction can universally
achieve (B − α)-weak security for MSR codes when ℓ = 1.
Theorem 2: The outer coset code of Construction 2 can be
used universally with any (n, k)MSR code to store Bs = kα
symbols over Fqα+1r with g-weak security for g = B − α
against an eavesdropper observing any ℓ = 1 node storing α
coded symbols.
Proof: First, it is easy to see that H is non-singular,
as it is a B × B Cauchy matrix with some of its columns
scaled by ω. Thus, we have Bs = B.
Next, we want to show that matrix T =
[
HG
Ge
]
is full-rank,
where Ge is the generator matrix of the observed node and
HG consists of B − α rows of H (see Lemma 1). Consider
the case when Eve observes one of the systematic nodes.
Since H ′ is a Cauchy matrix, any of its square sub-matrices
is full-rank. Using this property, it is easy to show that T
will be full-rank.
Suppose Eve observes a parity node j, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Note that, for any parity node k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, one can
easily show that the α×α block Gj,1 is full-rank as follows.
Suppose that a data collector downloads from parity node j,
k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and systematic nodes 2 through k. Since
any k out of n nodes allow reconstructing the set of B files,
Gj,1 must be full-rank.
Since Gj,1 is full-rank, we pre-multiply Gj in T by G
−1
j,1 .
Then, by multiplying each of the first α columns by ω, we
can transform T to the matrix T ′ shown in (11), for some
pi,j ∈ Fqr , 1 ≤ i ≤ α, 1 ≤ j ≤ B − α.
Now, the determinant of T ′ can be written as a polynomial
in ω as follows:
det(T ′) =
[
det
(
H ′G(α+ 1 : B)
)]
ωα + · · · , (15)
where H ′G(α+ 1 : B) is the (B − α)× (B − α) sub-matrix
of H ′G formed by its last B − α columns. Since H ′ is a
Cauchy matrix, det
(
H ′G(α+ 1 : B)
) 6= 0. Hence, det(T ′)
is a non-zero polynomial in ω with coefficients in Fqr , i.e.,
det(T ′′) ∈ Fq[ω]. Further, deg(det(T ′′)) = α. Since, ω is a
primitive element of Fqα+1r , it cannot be a root of a degree α
polynomial in Fqr [ω]. Therefore, det(T
′) 6= 0, and it follows
that T is full-rank.
Field Size Comparison: The universal outer code in [25]
based on rank-metric codes achieves g-weak security for any
ℓ and maximum possible g. The field size requirement is
q2B , where q is the field of the underlying storage code and
B = kα is the total number of information symbols. Since
q ≥ n for any known MSR code (see e.g., [27], [28], and
references therein), the required field size is O(n2kα).
The field size required for the proposed construction is
qα+1r , where qr is the smallest power of q greater than or
equal to 2B. Assuming that q = O(n) and 2B = 2kα > q,
the proposed construction requires the field size of at most
O
(
(nkα)α+1
)
. Note that for high-rate MSR codes, the best
known codes have α to be exponential in k, and it is shown
that α needs to be at least exponential in
√
k [31]. When α
is exponential in k, one can verify that the proposed scheme
requires a smaller field size than the rank-metric code based
scheme of [25] for a wide range of parameters.
V. CONCLUSION
We focused on the weak security paradigm in which Eve
gains no information about any group of g symbols. We
proposed a universal outer code that can weakly secure any
MSR code. In particular, we considered two scenarios: (i)
the eavesdropper has the maximum strength of ℓ = k − 1,
and the weak security level is the minimum g = 1; and (ii)
the eavesdropper has the minimum strength of ℓ = 1, but the
weak security level is the maximum possible g = B−α. Our
key idea is to utilize the structure present in the (systematic)
generator matrix of an MSR code to construct the outer code.
This enabled us to reduce the required field size compared
to the standard approaches based on rank-metric codes.
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